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INTERVENTION
by
Michael F. NOONE
Professor, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.
(United States of America)
Legal liability of the Armed Forces
when dealing with internal disturbances:
The unsatisfactory Anglo-American approach
Introduction
Andrew Jackson was the Norman Schwartzkopf of his time. Sent
to command the US Forces defending the city of New Orleans from
British attack during what we call the War of 1812, he soundly
defeated tham: killing and wounding 1.500 of a force of 5.000
and taking 500 prisoner at the expense of seven killed and six
wounded among his own forces (1). His great victory was only slighty
tarnished when both armies discovered a month later that the war had
been officially concluded seventeen days before the battle by the
Treaty of Ghent.
However, there is a darker side to this story: when Jackson arrived
in New Orleans he declared martial law - the Anglo American
equivalent of the state of siege, although the legal consequences are
not, I believe, identical. Two months after the battle and the announ-
cement of peace, Jackson offended a local judge by refusing to release
a civilian journalist whom the military had arrested for critizing the
general's decision to continue the system of martial law until the terms
of the peace treaty were known. The judge demanded that General
Jackson appear before him, and when the General did so, the Judge
fined him $1.000 (a very large sum in those days) which the hero paid
in order to show his respect for the law. This story - which is told in
detail in a recent issue of the US Army's Military Law Review (2)
illustrates a perennial problem that arises when military forces are used
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to suppress domestic turmoil: should individual members of the armed
forces be exempt from peacetime civilian laws which establish the
criteria for criminal and civil liability?
It could be said that, even though the external war was over,
General Jackson was operating in its aftermath, and wartime rules
applied. However General Jackson maintained military control because
of the threat of internal disorders. New Orleans had been founded by
the French in 1718, transferred to Spain in 1768, reacquired by the
French in 1800 and sold to the US in 1803. Jackson concluded that
the local population of Creoles might look on his army as an occupying
force rather than saviors. Therefore the incident falls squarely within
the terms of reference for this topic. I selected Jackson's incident for
another reason as well: he had sought legal advice and had been told
that his actions continuing martial law were justified, yet he was
penalized. How could this be? His legal advisors were well qualified
and objective - but the legal rules were (and in my judgement, still
are) confusing.
The balance of this paper will outline the historical development and
current state of the Anglo-American law regarding the criminal and civil
liability of military force when they are used in aid of the civil forces
in the hope that it will elicit two kind of response - criticism of my
thesis, and research by individuals into this timely and difficult problem.
Criminal Liability
Silent enim leges inter arma (3) - <<in time of war, the law is silent"
- readers of this journal know how misleading that statement is.
Criminal law is enforced in wartime - particularly in the case of
soldiers: penalties may be increased, special tribunals established, and
rules of liability modified, but all legal systems demand that members
of the armed forces must answer to some legal authority for their
crimes. Must they also answer for their civil wrongs - what we call
((torts)> - committed on behalf of the state? The question rarely
arises in practice: soldiers - except a few of superior rank - neither
have the personel resources nor liability insurance to pay for any
damage caused. I suspect that most governments have made some
provisions for compensating their own civilians - even in wartime -
for some types of damage caused by the armed forces. These
provisions, whatever they may be, merit the appellation of law. Thus,
the Ciceronian maxim is only partially true, even in wartime. Is it any
more true in times of domestic violence ?
678
INTERVENTIONS
In describing the Common Law (as distinguished from European
Civil Law) response to this question, it is important to maintain the
categories of civil and criminal liability, while adding two additional
categories which are intended to differentiate between law as a set
of rules of liability (law as a product) and law as a system for applying
those rules (law as a process).
The Common Law rules regarding criminal liability are relatively
simple: a member of the armed forces who commits a crime while
assisting in maintaining civil order is not protected from criminal
prosecution because of his military status. The soldier who carelessly
shoots a civilian during a riot will be treated like a policeman; both
may be prosecuted. Should the rules be identical? Traditionally the
policeman receives far more training in avoiding deadly force than does
the soldier.
One can point to the example of Trooper Barlow, a young British
soldier in Northern Ireland who was surrounded by unarmed women
who took away his rifle and held him (by crowding around him) until
an IRA gunman arrived and killed him (4). It is easy to say that Barlow
should not have permitted himself to be disarmed and detained. His
training may have been deficient. But if had used force - perhaps even
deadly force - to deter the unarmed women's efforts to disarm and
detain him, how would national law evaluate his behavior? Is it
sufficient to say that the process for determining which cases are to
be prosecuted will protect the ill-trained soldier, and that the rules for
soldier and police should be the same?
One British soldier has been convicted of a duty-related homicide in
Northern Ireland. He was imprisoned briefly and then returned to duty
with his unit. Would a police officer have been treated in the same
fashion? While the abstract rules regarding criminal liability seem clear,
the concrete practice is more obscure. Whatever the rules, another
issue arises regarding the legal process: Which is more appropriate:
to expose the soldier accused of criminal behavior to a potentially
hostile civilian legal system ? Or to an overly sympathetic military
system ?
With regard to the criminal process, U.S. practice is quite distinc-
tive. Unlike the British (and many other Common Law countries), we
claim the right to court-material our soldiers for all offenses commit-
ted while they are on active service. The military rules of criminal
liability are similar to those he would face in a civilian court, but
the military system or process that applies them would be capable of
far more empathy. The military can waive its rights to court-martial
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and turn the soldier over to the civilian system. What criteria should
decide the disposition of his case: domestic political considerations ?
The effect of the prosecution on military morale ? These are difficult
questions which are not limited to the lower ranks. As one nineteenth
century English general phrased the issue: If an officer decides not to
fire on a crowd, he may be court-martialed and shot for dereliction of
duty. If he does fire on the crowd, he may be tried and hanged for
murder (5). Neither US law nor its military training program would help
a twentieth century general resolve the dilemma. Can military lawyers
facilitate the decision?
Civil Liability
Somewhat different issues arise when we examine the civil liability
of soldiers performing internal security duties. Admittedly the problem
posed is somewhat unrealistic because few, if any, soldiers have the
resources or insurance to pay for their civil wrongs. In the mid 1940's
the US and UK passed laws generally permitting tort suits against the
sovereign (although some exceptions remain) and other nations have
similar laws - in many cases, predating the Anglo-American efforts.
Today, were a soldier to kill or injure a civilian while performing
internal security duties, a claim could be made against the state. In
the Common Law system, the state would first determine whether the
soldier was performing official duties, and then decide whether the
injury was due to fault. If these criteria were satisfied, the claimant
would be eligible for compensation. If these criteria were not satisfied,
the government might still offer compensation as a matter of grace,
although such exgratia payments are rare. Three problems arise even
if a state compensation system exists.
1. Should civil suits against soldiers be prohibited?
At Common Law a soldier's status did not affect his legal liability
although he could offer reasons for his behavior which might prelude
liability. The same principle applied in both civil and criminal law. In the
aftermath of civil unrest, when martial law had been declared, civilians
would sue soldiers. In order to prevent the legal harassment of soldiers
Parliament routinely passed Indemnity Acts (6) which prohibited
suits against them for acts done in good faith during the emergency.
A similar approach was taken by the American Congress during our
Civil War (7). Presently, a US statute prohibits tort suits against
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any government official (including soldiers) for acts done in the
performance of duty unless the injured person can establish that the
individual was acting in bad faith. As a practical consequence the
soldier need only satisfy his military superiors that his actions were
appropriate; if they are satisfied he will not be subject to military or civil
penalties. Civil libertarians object to this approach because it removes
the threat of civil sanctions.
2. It is appropriate to evaluate a soldier's behavior using civilian
standards of liability?
Because the Anglo American system is still based on fault one is
faced with the question of deciding when a soldier's decision failed
to meet the standard set by what a reasonably prudent person would
have done under similar circumstances. In two cases, one arising in
Northern Ireland, the other in the South, civilian judges ruled that
military authorities were at fault in siting observation posts and that
this fault caused the injuries complained of (8). Are civilian standards
appropriate in such cases ? If the standards are not appropriate, should
the injured persons simply be told that they are the unfortunate
victims of a fait du guerre and that no compensation is warrented ?
Or, in the alternative should payment be made solely on the basis of
causation without concern for fault ? Both the British and Israelis have
taken the latter approach, describing their payments as (acts of grave>
finally.
3. Whether or not fault is considered in determining tort liability
should the claimant's loyalty to the regime affect the determination?
The United States has not faced this problem for 125 years when,
after our Civil War, we demanded an oath of loyalty before compen-
sation would be paid for acts of the security forces. I know that the
British in Northern Ireland have faced this problem and believe that they
have rather recently concluded that all save individuals convicted of
political violence may receive ex gratia payments. The Israeli response
is less clear. If payment is made as an act of grace, then presumably
the sovereign can set whatever conditions it sees fit. If payment is
made on the basis of legal liability, should disloyal victims be compen-
sated ? If you conclude they should not, you must be willing to accept
the fact that the organs of state security will sometimes err in
determining loyalty. If you decide that loyalty to the regime should
be disregarded, you expose the government to loyalist criticism for
generosity and to false rebel claims.
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Conclusion
I have raised questions without answers; questions that may not be
important to those of us have not known domestic violence requiring
use of the military. Although we may represent the majority of readers
of this journal, our nations represent the exception. Our luck may
change and, whether or not it does, I suggest that we need to
reevaluate the common law legal rules regarding the civil and criminal
liability of soldiers used in situations of domestic violence.
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